Erosion of trust in humanitarian agencies: what strategies might help? by Jayasinghe, Saroj
Erosion of trust in humanitarian
agencies: what strategies might help?
Saroj Jayasinghe*
Department of Clinical Medicine, Faculty of Medicine, University of Colombo, Colombo, Sri Lanka
Aid agencies (AAs) provide a range of humanitarian and health related assistance globally. However, the trust
placed on them is eroding. Evidence for this includes accusations of a decline in their humanitarianism, and
the increasing number of conflicts with host states. An analysis of the concerns expressed yields two possible
reasons: a relative lack of transparency of their work and weak accountability mechanisms. This is further
supported by the existing milieu: an absence of internationally accepted instrument or mechanism to check
the credentials of INGOs and an opaque system of close links between some of the INGOs and their donors.
The article suggests two global strategies to tackle these issues: (a) Increase transparency by establishing a
global register of aid agencies. This should have basic information: their main goals and activities, countries
they are active in, number of employees, annual turnover of funds (updated regularly), principal financing
sources and nature of links with donors. This could also be available as printed manual that should be freely
available to client countries. (b) Ensure accountability by developing templates of fair legal instruments (to
facilitate and regulate work), and a set of generic rules and procedures of engagement for the interactions
between agencies and client states. These should be institutionalized within the regulatory frameworks of
countries and included in the Codes of Conduct of NGOs.
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A
id agencies are organisations that are dedicated
to distributing aid. At an international or global
level, three categories can be identified: those
functioning within governments (such as United States
Agency for International Development [USAID] that is
an institution within the US federal government) or
between governments (e.g. United Nations Development
Programme [UNDP] that is a global network linked to
the UN) or ‘independent’ private organisations known as
International Non-Governmental Organisations (IN-
GOs). All these organisations play increasingly important
roles in distributing development aid and humanitarian
assistance. In recent times, the scope of work of these
agencies, especially that of INGOs (including medical
philanthropists) have included an expanding circle of
interests in the health arena: providing health care to the
needy to responding to humanitarian crises to providing
comprehensive packages of health services to adminis-
trative regions in developing countries (1).
The initiatives of INGOs are often supported by the
international community, the WHO, and donors (1, 2).
However, in the recent past, there have been serious
concerns on their conduct and a sense of mistrust
developing among different stake holders. Evidence of
mistrust includes accusations of compromising humani-
tarian ideals, eagerness for profits and media coverage
and embracing political and religious agendas. The relief
effort in 2010 in Haiti prompted an editorial of the
Lancet (aptly titled Growth of aid and the decline of
humanitarianism) to note that some organisations are
driven by publicity and profit motives that compromise
humanitarian ideals (3). It stated that ‘... large aid
agencies can be obsessed with raising money through
their own appeal efforts. Media coverage as an end in
itself is too often an aim of their activities. Marketing and
branding have too high a profile. Perhaps worst of all,
relief efforts in the field are sometimes competitive with
little collaboration between agencies...’. There are also
increasing number of reports of conflicts and strains
between INGOs and developing countries. Some of the
conflicts indicate a perception among host governments
and other observers that certain INGOs have hidden
agendas (4). Events in Haiti in 2010, Sudan in 2009, in
Iraq and in Southern Asia after the 2004 tsunami,
illustrate the possible consequences of such a view. In
Haiti, NGO workers were arrested for child trafficking
during the relief efforts. Sudan accused the INGOs of
conniving with the International Criminal Court to issue
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charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity.
This led to the expulsion of 10 prominent INGOs (e.g.
Oxfam) that Sudan defended at the UN saying that they
had transgressed from their mandate and dared to
challenge Sudan’s sovereignty (5). In Iraq, faith-based
NGOs were suspected of unfair proselytisation under
cover of their humanitarian assistance, partly substan-
tiated when certain Christian relief agencies announced
their intention to mix humanitarian aid in Iraq with
evangelisation (6). A similar accusation was made after
the tsunami of December 2004, when some faith-based
NGOs were accused of attempting to blackmail vulner-
able communities to enter their faith to receive aid (7).
Root causes for erosion of trust
What are the root causes for this erosion of trust of
humanitarian agencies, especially the INGOs? The answer
is provided in part by analysing the concerns expressed in
relation to the above events: the 2004 tsunami, the
conflicts in Iraq and Sudan and the 2010 cyclone in Haiti
(37). All these situations had two main themes: an
accusation of hidden agendas (i.e. a lackof transparency),
and inadequacy of agreed mechanisms to ensure their
accountability that led to erratic responses such as
expulsion of INGOs from Sudan, arrest of volunteers in
Haiti and fast-track regulatory changes in Sri Lanka.
An analysis of the current milieu also reveals why there
is room for alleging lack of transparency. Firstly, there is
an absence of internationally accepted instruments or
mechanisms to check the credentials of INGOs. This is
particularly important because INGOs are increasingly
undertaking sensitive functions and roles. The INGOs
active in Sudan undertook a range of activities from the
least controversial areas such as provision of health care
and humanitarian assistance, to the more sensitive areas
of promoting human rights. This enables INGOs to
interact with people from diverse settings and ability to
influence communities in client states. As a result, it is
relatively easy to be accused of ‘interference’ in national
politics, cultures or ideologies. On the contrary, this wide
range of activities also gives opportunities for unscrupu-
lous INGOs to pursue hidden agendas other than pure
altruism, as shown in the example on faith-based NGOs.
These agendas could include political, social or commer-
cial objectives (e.g. spreading the ideology of a free
market), and aid for profit (24).
Secondly, there are almost opaque, secretive and close
links between some of the INGOs and their donors. This
situation is mainly a result of INGOs’ dependency on
external funding for their survival and growth. In reality,
they negotiate with the donors on utilisation of funds and
are accountable to the latter. The details of these
negotiations and agreements are rarely made public,
and remain unknown to host governments and ‘client’
communities where projects are conducted. As a result of
this combination of factors, it is reasonable to suspect
that some of the work programmes of INGOs are directly
or indirectly driven by the agendas of global funding
organisations, philanthropists and donors.
As for the alleged lack of accountability of INGOs, the
mainreasonappearstobetheirascendencyinpower.Over
the years, they have gained influence, power and financial
resourcesthatoftenoutweighindividualdevelopingstates,
especially those with weak regulatory structures. It is said
that ‘a small handful (of them), while working in some of
the most dangerous and impoverished places on earth,
wield enormous influence  setting aid agendas, shaping
policy, and changing the way the world does development’
(8). A recent example is the renewed emphasis given by
largephilanthropicgroupstocontrolspecificdiseasessuch
as malaria, HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis, which may have
distorted health priorities in developing countries. These
initiatives are criticised for promoting a selective form of
primary health care and for promoting internal brain
drain (from the public sector health system to the NGO
sector), thus depleting already under-staffed health sys-
tems (9, 10). This power to influence global and national
health policies is derived from their large resource base of
INGOs and philanthropists (e.g. Bill and Melinda Gates
Foundation distributed US$ 2 billion in grants in 2006)
thatoftenexceedsthebudgetsofsmaller nations,andtheir
recognition by institutions such as the UN where some of
INGOS have ‘independent’ observer status in statutory
institutions,e.g.Economic,SocialandCulturalCouncilof
the UN [ECOSOC] (11). By way of these memberships,
some INGOs provide reports on the conduct of nation-
states, and these encounters are known to be acrimonious.
There is also the possibility of bias in the perspectives of
INGOs because of approximately 3,000 of them in the
ECOSOC’s consultative category, about two-thirds are
from North America and Europe, which constitutes less
than a fifth of the global population. Despite this obvious
asymmetry of power between INGOs and host states,
there are no universally accepted guidelines or rules of
engagement between host states and INGOs.
What can be done to stem this erosion of trust of
INGOs? The author of this article proposes three main
strategies and corresponding policy instruments to tackle
the issues of relative lack of transparency and account-
ability, thereby improving the situation from global and
national levels. It also delineates a potential role for a UN
organisation such as the WHO.
Strategies to tackle root causes
There are at least three ways to tackle the root causes
described in the previous section. These are (1) lack of
transparency to be tackled by improving access to
information of INGOs (2) weak accountability of INGOs
to be countered by, developing a template of fair legal
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the interactions between INGOs and host states.
Improving access to information
Increasing access to information on INGOs could be
achieved by establishing a Global Register of INGOs.
The large number of INGOs, estimated in 2,000, to be
around 26,000 makes this a truly global task, because a
single nation or a grouping cannot keep track of the fast
proliferating INGOs (12).
A Global Register of INGOs
The idea behind a Global Register is to collate and have
accessible information on the INGOs. Relevant informa-
tion includes, their goals, objectives, relationship to
principal donors or faiths, portfolio of work and areas
of expertise, previous work and their outcomes, sources of
funds, annual summary budget (at local and international
level), number of employees, areas of humanitarian
assistance, approvals by other host states to provide
humanitarian assistance and any situations where they
were denied access to a country. The records of previous
work should include an outline of the project, summary
budgets, clients and donors and complying with time
lines. An important aspect is a clear statement of the
donors and the basic agreement made with the donors
about specific projects. Expenditures should, perhaps,
include the proportion spent on the project per se in
contrast to the administrative costs (that includes con-
sultation fees). The required information will improve
transparency of the dealings of INGOs and should be
updated at regular intervals. One may have to provide a
hyperlink to the respective INGO website to give more
elaborate information.
Entry into the Global Registry will require a process of
validation. The process used by ECOSOC to award
consultative status will provide a template (11). One
criterion could be that the INGO be a signatory to an
acceptable code of conduct (e.g. the Code of Conduct of
the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Move-
ment). Second criterion could be to present supporting
documentation from the countries where the INGO is
already registered, funding sources and strategies for
sustainability. Initially being in the register could be
voluntary, and those wishing to work across national
borders should be encouraged to be included. The
register should be accessible globally via the Internet.
An example of a register in the UN system is the one
by ECOSOC that has basic information of 3,187 NGOs
that have links with the UN (11). The information in this
register is limited to activities of the NGO in relation to
the UN. A more informative register is the one main-
tained by the Charity Commissioner’s Office in the UK
(13). The Office maintains a register of charities (almost
189,000), their governing documents and accounts (of
those who earn more than 10,000 sterling pounds), all of
which are accessible to the public. The register gives
specific aspects of each registered charity (e.g. main
activities, countries they work in, number of employees
and annual turnover of funds, etc.). There are other
examples of registers that have been developed to increase
transparency and to facilitate access of information such
as the clinical trials register of the US government (14). It
lists more than 65,000 entries from 161 countries, with
information about a trial’s purpose, that may participate,
locations and phone numbers for more details. Entry to
the register requires approval ‘by a human subject review
board (or equivalent) and conform to the regulations of
the appropriate national health authorities’. The registry
is a public document and gives information to potential
recruits as well as investigators.
Hosting the Register can be contentious, and the
process will require dedicated funding and human
resources. A UN-based institution such as the WHO or
the UNDP or the ECOSOC could establish the register.
The WHO that has some expertise in health ethics may be
better placed to take the initiative in this endeavour. They
could begin by hosting a register of INGOs working in
the area of health. This experience could be used to widen
scope where other INGOs are also progressively included.
Such a mechanism of registering is not alien to the WHO
that has a template for certification of institutions such as
drug manufactures (15). The Global Register could also
improve the quality of INGOs working in host states. In
addition to being an authoritative source of information,
host states could regulate that INGOs should be in the
Register prior to working in the country.
ThecontentsoftheRegistershouldalsobeavailableasa
printed manual that could be used by state officials during
negotiations. The Register could also include information
inatabulatedformandupdatedatintervals,maybeyearly.
A complaints procedure
To improve the process of accountability and transpar-
ency, there could be a special official or an ombudsman
within the UN to arbitrate on serious conflicts in relation
to entries in the Register. This is analogous to the office
of the Independent Expert on Human Rights and
International Solidarity, established in 2005 under the
Human Rights Council. At times of conflict, the ombuds-
men could solicit for information from relevant sources,
directly observe the functioning of the INGOs by making
country visits and evaluate the performance of INGOs
using published reports.
Although this is not a foolproof system, a Global
Register on the lines described above is a step in the right
direction to reduce asymmetry of information and
improve transparency of INGOs. This will enhance the
credibility and trust on INGOs and facilitate the
implementation of their humanitarian agendas.
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Most developed countries have regulatory instruments
that enable the states to monitor and facilitate the work
of the voluntary sector. In contrast, developing countries
often have neither sophisticated regulatory instruments
nor legislations to facilitate and regulate the voluntary
sector. A recent example was the situation that arose after
the December 2004 tsunami in Sri Lanka. In the after-
math, there were almost 2,000 new NGOs working on
tsunami relief, as a result of an influx of foreign NGOs
and newly established local ones. The government had to
take several measures to control this chaotic situation
(e.g. to require all NGOs to register their activities, in
some instances obtain the Defence Ministry clearance,
new procedures to grant visas and adoption of proce-
dures to facilitate customs clearance) (7). This lack of
clear legislations to meet diverse challenges during
humanitarian emergencies leads governments to formu-
late ill-conceived measures. To meet this challenge and
improve accountability of INGOs, a generic template of a
fair legal instrument ought to be developed. This will
facilitate legitimate work within host countries, and
although adding to bureaucracy it will prevent exploita-
tion of its vulnerable citizens. The WHO could draw on
its technical expertise to formulate such legal instruments,
as has been done in other situations: setting ‘ground rules
for contracting practices’ in the health sector and
legislation to control tobacco (15, 16). Ideally, these
legislations should be formulates by consensus within the
international community, and enable INGOs to be aware
of their potential and limitations for work in different
countries. An illustrative example is the Charities Act of
2006 in England and Wales that defines the parameters of
charity work by stating that ‘an essential requirement of
all charities is that they operate for the public benefit and
independently of government or commercial interests’
(13). The Commissioner facilitates the work of the
voluntary sector by releasing guidelines on good practice,
releasing useful information (e.g. details of relevant
legislations) via the Internet and by conducting training
programmes. As part of their regulatory role, they review
the accounts of charities and pay visits to observe the
conduct of the charity organisations.
By their very nature, the voluntary sectors tend to be
loosely knit and prefer a considerable degree of auton-
omy in their work. Thus, self-regulation is probably the
most favoured strategy that would help them to harmo-
nise the altruistic intentions with other constraints they
experience. Therefore, another strategy is to develop, or
improve existing codes to a globally accepted Code of
Conduct (10, 17). There are a number of codes such as
that of Red Cross, with varying degrees of success and
after 10 years of its existence, by 2004 the Red Cross’s
Code had only 300 signatories (10, 17).
The Code could reiterate some of the aspects of the
Global Register, taking into account the conditions
stipulated in the generic regulatory template, and the
‘rules of engagement’ described below. For example, the
Code could include a statement that INGOs should
provide basic information as regards to their goals,
objectives, work plans, funding sources to their client
communities and make the agreements with donors
accessible to clients and governments. Acceptance of
the conditions of the Code could be a prerequisite for
entry to the Global Register.
Procedures for interactions
The third option is to develop clear rules of engagement
between INGOs and client states that promote fair
procedures (18). These procedures for interactions should
be institutionalised within the regulatory frameworks of
host countries and in the Codes of Conduct of NGOs.
They should be adhered to when INGOs wish to begin
work in a host country. This will also increase transpar-
ency of transactions and prevent or soften conflicts.
An example of a fair procedural process is outlined
below:
1. Initial public consultation: This focuses on type of
humanitarian assistance required by a nation-state
and to establish ‘ground rules’. A process of public
consultation will enable to identify the broad needs
of the communities, and the process could be
facilitated by the government or local administra-
tion of a country. The ‘ground rules’ would focus on
how to avoid conflicts in some of the areas: criteria
to select areas for assistance, mix of services to be
provided, fair selection of INGOs to provide assis-
tance, espousing particular political, sociocultural or
religious opinions. Other areas that could be dis-
cussed include ensuring equity of access to services,
sustainability of interventions and evaluation of the
performance of the INGOs. This will be a healthy
exchange of ideas, and the different stakeholders will
be able to know each other more closely. In contrast,
the current situation in most countries is for the
INGOs to obtain permission from a government
department or authority to commence work in the
country. The target community for humanitarian
assistance is rarely consulted or made aware of the
work or the projects of INGOs.
2. Process of decision making: Decisions are made on
overcoming the contentious issues listed above (and
any others). These decisions ought to be based on
reasons and principles that are explicitly stated.
There should also be an inbuilt method to appeal
against any decisions, for example, the appointment
of an independent ombudsman who could arbitrate
and make a final decision.
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the decisions via official documents, media releases
aimed especially at the client country.
4. Constant review: A mechanism is in place in the
country’s regulatory system and within INGOs to
review the policies regularly during the period when
it is working and after completion of the project.
5. Enforcement: There are mechanisms within the
INGOs and the country’s regulatory system to
ensure that the above conditions are met. For
example, INGOs are accountable to their Trustees
or Board of Governors, donors and to the client
country, if they default on their work plan. Some of
the larger projects may even warrant an insurance
policy, to cover against sudden unexpected disrup-
tion from the agreement.
Some may criticise these procedures as unnecessary and
too bureaucratic. However, INGOs, donors and interna-
tional organisations have clearly laid down extensive
procedures for tenders and procurements for projects. If
so, there is no reason as to why a similarly extensive
document cannot be developed to explicitly state the
ground rules for engagement between INGOs and client
states. It is also necessary to enhance the capacities of
states to negotiate with INGOs about the fair procedures
described in the previous section. This objective can be
achieved by producing manuals that describe the proce-
dures and by conducting training programmes for state
officials and civil society groups. The manuals ought to
be available in print form as well as in the web.
Conclusion
Despite conducting difficult and essential humanitarian
tasks, there is a sense of increasing mistrust of INGOs.
The author proposes several related strategies and policy
instruments that may help to tackle and reverse this
situation. If preventive measures are not introduced at a
global level, the trust between communities, countries
and INGOs will gradually erode. This would eventually
compromise the long-term provision of health care,
humanitarian assistance, developmental aid and promo-
tion of human rights by INGOs.
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